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Abstract
We present a simple political economy model that explains two major puzzles of
government policies to combat HIV/AIDS epidemic: the lack of policy response in many
countries where the epidemic is massive and the reversal of the downward trend in HIV
prevalence in the countries that have adopted early agressive prevention campaigns.
The model builds on the assumption that the unaware citizens impose a negative
externality on the aware by increasing the risk of contagion. Prevention campaigns
raise awareness of the current generation, which then partially transmit this awareness
to the next generation, thus creating political support for the next-period awareness
campaigns. The economy has two steady-state equilibria: the ’good’ one (with high
awareness and low prevalence) and the "bad" one (low awareness, high prevalence).
The "good" equilibrium is fragile, i.e. a su¢ciently large exogenous drop in HIV
prevalence undermines the next-generation political support for campaigns and makes
the economy drift away towards the "bad" equilibrium.
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11 Introduction
The HIV/AIDS epidemic is a major social and economic problem that a-icts many devel-
oping countries. For the countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, it is perhaps the main problem
that - because of the extremely high prevalence rates and associated mortality rates - has
been having devastating e¤ects on the lives of citizens in this part of the world. While now
we understand how the disease acts on human organism and how it spreads better than a
decade ago (see Barrett and Whiteside (2006) for an excellent review), our knowledge of the
social side of the problem, i.e. how societies have been tackling the HIV/AIDS epidemic is
more limited.
When looking at the way di¤erent countries a¤ected by the HIV/AIDS epidemic have
been reacting to the disease, we see two puzzling facts. First, the countries that are most hit
by the epidemic are not, on average, reacting more to it than the countries less a¤ected by
the disease. One measure of the policy actions taken against the disease is the AIDS Program
E¤ort Index (the API score) constructed by the USAID, UNAIDS, and WHO (USAID et
al. 2003). It is a survey-based measure of e¤ort put by national governments to combat
HIV/AIDS. Figure 1 plots the average API score in 2001-2003 against the HIV prevalence
rate among adults aged 15-49, for the countries for which the API scores in those two years
are available. We note that the countries with the highest prevalence rates (reaching over 30
per cent in several African countries) have, on average, only slightly higher API scores than
the countries with relatively low prevalence rates.
[Figure 1 about here]
One obvious explanation would be the malfunctioning of the political system in most
of these countries. For instance, the lack of political accountability is a well-known malaise
of Sub-Saharan African countries (Van de Walle 2001). However, if we look at the opinions
of ordinary citizens, the puzzle gets stronger. Figure 2 shows the results of the surveys
conducted in seven Southern African countries by Alan Whiteside and his colleagues. It
plots on the horizontal axis the percentage of respondents that declare to have personally
known someone who died of AIDS, and on the vertical axis - the percentages of respondents
who consider health and HIV/AIDS as most important problems. Whereas for countries
where fewer citizens know someone who died of AIDS we observe that considering health
and HIV/AIDS increase with disease awareness and move together, for the countries with
2the higest shares of people that know someone who died of AIDS, considering HIV/AIDS as
a most important problem falls sharply.
[Figure 2 about here]
This …nding reveals the problem of HIV/AIDS ’denial’ that many commentators have
been describing. For instance, Jacob Bor (2007) argues:
“The failure of elected leaders to respond to AIDS may re‡ect a rational response
to the demands of their constituents. Africans consistently rank HIV/AIDS low
among their political priorities, preferring government action on unemployment,
the economy, poverty, water, and crime.” (Bor 2007)
Similarly, Alan Whiteside et al. (2004) state that
“Southern Africans simply do not list HIV/AIDS as a political priority for their
governments ... it could be that people see the responsibility for HIV/AIDS to
lie with individuals and communities rather than governments, perhaps because
they do not believe that governments have the ability to deliver in this area.”
(Whiteside et al. 2004)
Thus, this puzzle can be summarized as follows: how can this absence of policy response
to HIV/AIDS exist in the countries with such high prevalence rates? This is especially
striking given than the policy success stories (i.e. the countries where governments took
active measures against the disease, e.g. Uganda, Thaliand, Senegal, Philippines, and Brazil)
have caused the HIV prevalence rates fall sharply. How can we explain these two strikingly
di¤erent paths: on the one have, countries with extensive anti-HIV/AIDS policies and low
prevalence rates, and on the other - countries with very limited policy response even in the
face of extremely high prevalence?
The second puzzle emerges when we look at the evolution of the HIV/AIDS in the popu-
lation across time in countries that have experienced an early fall in the disease prevalence,
caused by the active policies adopted by their governments. Figure 3 comes from a recent
research paper by Oster (2008), where she constructs a measure of HIV incidence in Uganda
between 1983 and 1995. We can see that the early fall in HIV incidence coinciding with
the 1986 prevention campaign lauched by President Museveni is followed by the sharp rise
starting around 1993.
3[Figure 3 about here]
A similar picture emerges when we look at the evolution of the HIV incidence in Brazil.
Figure 4 illustrates the evolution similar to the one in Uganda: the fall between 1998 and
2001 is followed by the rise after 2001.
[Figure 4 about here]
The puzzle emering from these …gures is why the success stories can get reversed? Why
the policy actions that have been seemingly very e¤ective in reducing the disease incidence
and prevalence loses its e¤ect or gets abandoned?
This paper presents a simple political economy model that explains these puzzles. We
build it around the assumptions that HIV/AIDS prevention campaigns have some e¤ective-
ness and that the aware individuals prefer the government to spend money on prevention
campaigns (because of the negative externality that unaware individuals impose on the
aware; in other words, private prevention is not su¢cient to eliminate the risk of conta-
gion). The key idea of the model is that the awareness created by current-period prevention
campaigns transmits - through parents to children - into the next generation, thus creating
the next-period political support for the prevention campaigns. There are three types of
agents: aware, unaware and conservative. The two latter groups are opposed to government
spending on prevention. Therefore, the positive government spending on prevention becomes
an equilibrium only when the share of aware citizens is su¢ciently high to constitute the
majority.
Instead, the disease transmits both across and within generations. It transmits from
the old to the young through the sexual contacts between the elder sick individuals and
the young unaware citizens. It then transmits within the young generation through sexual
contact between the young.
Because of the two-way relationship between prevention policy and awareness described
above, we …nd that there exist two stable steady-state equilibria: one with high share of aware
citizens and low HIV prevalence, and the other - with low awareness and high prevalence.
We study the comparative statics properties of the steady-state equilibria, and also analyze
the short-run dynamics of the economy. Notably, we …nd that the "good" equilibrium (i.e.
the one with low HIV prevalence) is fragile, meaning that a su¢ciently large exogenous drop
in HIV prevalence makes the economy drift away to the "bad" equilibrium, because the
4fall in prevalence also means a fall in political support for further goverrnment spending on
prevention. We also discuss the role of NGOs and foreign donors in prevention, and …nd that
in order to have permanent reduction e¤ects on HIV prevalence, these outside interventions
should be su¢ciently large to create a self-sustaining political support.
Next, we discuss several case studies that allow us to evaluate the theoretical model. In
particular, we look at the political-economic factors behind government policies in Uganda,
Brazil, Kenya, South Africa, and Thailand.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical model, with Section
2.1 describing the model’s setup, Section 2.2 deriving the steady-state political-economic
equilibria, Section 2.3 looking at their comparative statics properties, and Section 2.4 ana-
lyzing the short-run dynamics of the model. Section 3 concludes by discussing the potential
e¤ects of relaxing the model’s basic assumptions on our results, the limitations of the model,
and the possible extensions.
2 Model
2.1 Setup
Consider an overlapping-generations economy populated in each period t = 0;1;2;::: with
two types of atomistic agents: old (O) and young (Y ). The size of each cohort is constant
and equals 1. Each agent lives for two periods. At the end of the …rst period of life, each
agent has exactly one child. We are thus abstracting from the issues related to population
growth. The next-period payo¤s are discounted by the discount factor ￿ < 1. Young agents
work and get a …xed income normalized to 1. Old agents do not work.
Agents also di¤er in terms of their health status: each agent is either healthy (H) or sick
(S). The proportion of sick in period 0 is ￿0 > 0.
Finally, agents also di¤er in terms of their position with respect to the government policy
towards the disease. We assume that the proportion 1 ￿ ￿ of agents is conservative (c):
these agents engage only in safe sex and a priori are opposed to any government action
towards the disease. The remaining fraction of agents; ￿ 2 (0;1), are either aware (a) about
the existence of a simple costless technology e¤ective in reducing the spread of the disease
(for instance, safe sex practices), or are unaware (u) about it. The policy support comes
only from the aware agents. At time t, the proportion of young agents that are aware of the
potentially bene…cial government action is denoted by q
y
t. This proportion will be determined
5endogenously.
There are three sources of awareness for the young agents:
(1) inter-generational transmission (via parents or elder relatives trying to inform their
children or, more generally, via interactions with older citizens in social networks), measure
by the parameter ￿ 2 (0;1);
(2) information campaigns conducted by NGOs;
(3) government policy: information campaigns.





t￿1 + qNt + qPt; (1)
where qNt and qPt are the fractions of young agents that get informed via NGOs and govern-
ment policies, respectively. We are thus implicitly assuming that the NGO and government
campaigns are perfectly targeted to unaware agents.
Concerning the government policy, the unit cost of the government information campaign
is p. The information campaigns are …nanced by a lump-sum tax on all working agents.
Government cannot run de…cits. The period-t government budget constraint is then simply:
￿t = pqPt, (2)
where ￿t is the period-t tax.
The disease gets transmitted via sexual contact. For simplicity (and withoutt loss of
generality), we assume that the transmission rate from a sick partner to a healthy one,
in the absence of preventive action, is 1. The technology to prevent disease transmission
works as follows. If both partners in the sexual intercourse apply the technology, the risk
of transmission is zero. If only one of the partners applies the technology, the transmission
rate is 1￿￿. Note that this a stylized representation of the existing prevention technologies
(condoms, safe sex). The main point of such modelling choice is to capture the idea that
private preventive action is not su¢cient to insulate oneself fully from the risk of catching
the disease.
The disease trasmits …rst inter-generationally and then within the young generation. All
agents are born healthy. We assume that young aware agents abstain from having sex with
the partners from the older generation. Young unaware agents have sex with a member of
the old generation with probability ￿ 2 (0;1). Then, denoting with ￿
i;j
t the probability of
6being sick for an agent of age i 2 fy;og and awareness type j 2 fa;ug, we get the following
relations that describe the inter-generational disease transmission:
￿
y;a
















The expression in square brackets in (4) is the probability that a partner from the older
generation is sick. ￿
o;a
t is the prevalence of the disease among the old aware agents, the




the transmission rate in this match is 1￿￿. Similarly, ￿
o;u
t is the prevalence rate among the
old unaware, and the probability of entering a match with this type of agent is 1￿q
y
t￿1 (the
transmission rate in this match is 1).
Next, non-conservative young agents engage in sexual behavior with one randomly chosen
partner. The health status of a young agent is discovered in the next period. Given that
the technology to prevent disease transmission is the same as described above, any young




















t (1 ￿ q
y
t): (6)
The aware young agent is healthy before entering the sexual relationship within her gener-
ation. The only channel through which she can catch the disease is by having sex with an
unaware sick partner. The prevalence of the disease among the young unaware agents is ￿
y;u
t
and the probability of entering a match with such a partner is 1 ￿ q
y
t (the transmission rate
being 1 ￿ ￿).
On the contrary, the unaware young agent can be sick already before having sex within
her generation (as she can catch the disease from the older generation), the probability of
this event being ￿
y;u
t . In addition, if healthy (with probability 1 ￿ ￿
y;u
t ), she can catch the
disease from the sexual contact with a sick partner within her generation: the probability of




t (remember that all young aware are healthy
before the within-generation sexual contact) and the transmission rate is 1.
The corresponding probabilities of being healthy, Pr(H
o;i




Aware agents understand that these probabilities are in‡uenced by government policies,
while unaware agents consider them as constants (with respect to government actions).
7Given that the health status is revealed only in the beginning of the second period of life,
the ex ante utility of the agent of type i 2 fa;u;cg is
U
i
t = v(1 ￿ ￿t) + ￿[Pr(H
o;i
t+1)(1 + ￿)￿ + Pr(S
o;i
t+1)￿]; (7)
where v(:) is a concave function, ￿ is the (exogenous) utility of a health agent when old, and
￿ is the utility loss caused by illness (e.g. shortened lifetime of the sick agent).
The within-period timing of events for a young agent is as follows:
￿ The agent inherits the conservativeness or awareness from from older generation (inter-
generational transmission of awareness);
￿ All young agents work and produce income y normalized to 1.
￿ Simple majority voting on the size of the goverment policy occurs, with only the young
having the right to vote. The vote is open agenda referendum. The Condorcet-winner
policy is implemented;
￿ NGOs and the government inform the measures qNt and qPt of young agents, respec-
tively.
￿ Unaware young agents engage in sex with the older generation (inter-generational trans-
mission of the disease).
￿ All young agents are randomly matched into couples and have sex (within-generation
tranmission of the disease). The end-period health status is determined (still unknown
by the agents). One child is born to each young agent.
The timing of events within a period for the old agent is as follows:
￿ The health status of the agent is revealed;
￿ If the agent is healthy, she enjoys the payo¤ of (1 + ￿)￿; if she is sick, she gets the
payo¤ of ￿. Old agents neither work nor vote.
For simplicity we assume that the NGOs conduct the campaigns of identical extent in
each period:
qNt = qN for any t:
82.2 Political-economic equilibrium
Let’s now derive policy preferences of di¤erent types of young agents (old agents do not vote,
thus their preferences play role in the political-economic equilibrium):
￿ Conservative and unaware agents prefer zero policy (and zero taxes), as they consider
the policy only as a tax burden, with no bene…ts accruing to them;
￿ Aware agents prefer a positive amount of policy. This is because sick agents impose a
negative externality on the healthy ones: the technology that prevents disease trans-
mission works imperfectly if only one of the partners uses it. Thus, the aware young
agents (that are initally healthy) trade the tax cost of the policy against the bene…t
of internalizing this negative externality, by reducing the number of unaware agents
(remember that if both agents are aware, the disease transmission is fully prevented).
More precisely, the ex ante utility of the aware agent is
U
a
t = v(1 ￿ pqPt) + ￿[(1 ￿ ￿
o;a





t+1 is described by (5).
Using (1) in (5), and maximizing (8) with respect to the policy variable qPt, we get the
following …rst-order condition:1
pv
0(1 ￿ pqPt) = ￿￿￿￿
y;u
t (1 ￿ ￿): (9)
The left-hand side of (9) describes the marginal cost of a larger government policy (a
decrease in the utility caused by lower post-tax income), while the right-hand side describes
the marginal bene…t: larger policy reduces the risk of transmission of the disease by the
amount equal to ￿
y;u
t (1 ￿ ￿), and this marginal reduction is multiplied by the discounted
di¤erential utility of being healthy (as compared to being sick) when old, ￿￿￿.
Note that the higher is the fraction of potential unaware sick partners in the young pop-
ulation, ￿
y;u
t , the larger is the marginal bene…t of the government policy for the aware voter.
Obviously, since the extent of the negative externality is larger, the aware voter would prefer
a more agressive government information campaign. Also note that as ￿ approaches 1, the
support of the aware voter for the government policy declines, because the private solution
1The problem is concave, so the second-order condition is satis…ed.
9to the disease transmission problem (i.e. the unilateral use of the prevention technology) be-
comes more e¤ective. In other words, private and public solutions to the disease transmission
act as substitutes.
Given these policy preferences of di¤erent types of voters, the set of possible con…g-
urations of political-economic equilibrium is simple: aware voters constitute the majority
(positive-policy equilibrium); unaware voters plus the conservatives constitute the majority
(zero-policy equilibrium). Thus, the preferred policy of the aware voters (described by the
equation (9)) is implemented if and only if
￿￿q
y
t￿1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) + ￿(1 ￿ ￿q
y
t￿1); (10)







A few important points should be noted about the mechanism behind this political-
economic equilibrium. The awareness gets transmitted across generations through families
and networks. Being an unaware young citizen implies two negative e¤ects on the overall
health conditions in the economy. On the one hand, it implies the transmission of ignorance
to the next generation, thus adding to the vote against a positive policy. On the other
hand, it implies the inter-generational transmission of the disease, via the risk of the early
infection from risky sex with the older generation. Note also that the government policies
do not a¤ect the current voters: the political mechanism is such that the young voters made
aware in period t transmit this awareness (imperfectly) to theis children who vote in period
t + 1.
We now turn to determining steady-state equilibria (which in our setup imply constant
levels of disease, ￿, and awareness, q, in the population).
Using (5)-(6), we can rewrite (3)-(4) in period t + 1 as
￿
y;a


























Solving (13) for the steady-state values, we get
￿
y;u = 1 ￿
1
￿(1 ￿ qy)2 +






Higher fraction of young aware agents leads to a lower steady-state level of the disease
among the unaware agents. This occurs via two channels: (1) the aware agents do not inherit
10the disease from the older generation; (2) the aware agents use the prevention technology
which slows down the spread of the disease within the young generation.
Furthermore, let’s assume that the sub-utility function v(:) is logarithmic. Then, the
…rst-order condition (9) in the steady-state gives us the following expression for the preferred











Clearly, the higher is the fraction of sick young (unaware) agents, the larger is the preferred
policy of the aware, as the negative externality becomes stronger.






(14), (15), and (16) jointly describe the steady-state equilibria of the model. Figure 5
represents these equilibria graphically.
[Figure 5 about here]
We can thus state the following
Proposition 1 There are two steady-state equilibria: one with zero policy, zero awareness
(in the absence of NGO activities), and high prevalence of the disease in the population, and
the other with positive policy, high awareness, and low prevalence of the disease.2
On the right of the majority support line (16), the steady-state political economic equilib-
rium must satisfy two conditions. Since the aware voters constitute a majority, the size of the
government policy must re‡ect the preferences of the aware voters, for any level of the disease
in the population. Thus, the equilibrium point must lie on the green ("preferred-policy")
line, described by the equation (15). Secondly, the dynamics of the disease spread must have
stabilized around its steady-state level. In other words, the equilibrium point must lie on
the blue ("AIDS epidemics") line, described by the equation (14). Given that the relations
(14) and (15) are monotonic, there is only one intersection point, which contemporaneously
satis…es both relations.
2There also exists a third steady-state equilibrium with zero prevalence. However, it is unstable, so we
do not consider it in our analysis.
11On the left of the majority line, the aware voters constitute a minority and thus the
equilibrium policy re‡ect the preferences of conservative and unaware voters: equilibrium size
of the policy is therefore zero. The dynamics of the spread of the disease is still determined
by (14). Therefore, the equilibrium is the highest point of the "AIDS epidemics" line. It is
easy to verify that both equilibria are stable.
Intuitively, the …rst ("good") equilibrium has a relatively high fraction of young aware
voters. These voters are su¢ciently numerous to constitute a majority, which means that
suubsequent-period government information campaigns are relatively large. These policies
internalize the negative externality and induce a realtively low inter- and intra-generational
spread of the disease in the population. Moreover, there are also a su¢ciently high number of
aware voters in the next period (because of the inter-generational transmission of awareness),
which guarantees that the positive policy is voted in the subsequent periods. In the second
("bad") equilibrium the majority is constituted of the conservative and unaware voters, which
means that the government implements zero prevention campaigns. This implies a strong
inter- and intra-generational transmission of the disease, which leads to a high prevalence.
Also, the inter-generational transmission of awareness is absent, which implies that the zero
policy is voted in the future.
This mechanism is the answer to the …rst puzzle described in the introduction and explains
why di¤erent countries subject to the high risk of the spread of the disease have followed
such strikingly di¤erent paths of both government actions agains HIV/AIDS and the spread
of the disease. It also helps to understand why many African countries with extremely high
rates of prevalence fail to take any serious government action against the epidemic.
2.3 Comparative statics
The steady-state equilibria are fully parameterized by the set (p;￿;￿;￿;￿;￿;￿). We can
now analyze the comparative statics properties of equilibria with respect to some of these
parameters.
Proposition 2 An increase in the inter-generational transmission of the disease (￿, the
probability of sexual contact between the young unaware and the old agents) increases equi-
librium prevalence. If the economy is in the "good" equilibrium, the equilibrium awareness
also increases, which softens the rise in prevalence.
12A change in sexual behavior that increases contacts between the young unaware and the
old would shift upwards the "AIDS epidemics" curve, i.e. increase the disease prevalence
for any level of the awareness, simply because the disease precipitates more from the older
generation to the younger one. If the economy is in the "bad" equilibrium, given that
the equilibrium policy is zero, this increase in ￿ translates entirely into higher equilibrium
prevalence. This occurs because the policy does not react as the prevalence starts to rise.
Contrarily, if the economy is in the "good" equilibrium, the equilibrium policy (which
re‡ects the preferences of the aware citizens) responds to changes in prevalence. Thus;
as prevalence starts to rise, aware citizens vote for a larger policy. The increase in the
policy never counterweighs fully the rise in prevalence, so the at the new equilibrium, the
prevalence is higher, even though the increase is smaller than it would be in the case of the
"bad" equilibrium.
Proposition 3 If the economy is in the "good" equilibrium, an decrease in the unit price
of the government awareness campaign (p) or an increase in the utility di¤erential (￿) of
healthy old (as compared to the sick) reduces prevalence and increases awareness. The e¤ect
is nil if the economy is in the "bad" equilibrium.
If awareness campaigns become cheaper, the marginal bene…t of the campaigns increases.
Then, the aware voters would prefer a larger policy (a rightward shift in the "Preferred pol-
icy" curve), which, in the "good" equilibrium, would imply that the equilibrium policy would
increase. This increase in the policy reduces the inter- and intra-generational transmission -
and therefore, the spread - of the disease, which would soften the initial spike in the policy.
This softening, however, does not outweigh the initial policy action, which means that the
equilibrium exhibits a lower prevalence and a higher awareness. Obviously, if the aware vot-
ers constitute a minority, this shift in their preferred policy has no e¤ect on the equilibrium
policy.
Note another interesting implication of this result. Suppose the better anti-retroviral
drugs increase the lifetime of the sick (and/or ease their su¤erings). In our model, this
would imply a reduction in the utility di¤erential between the sick and the healthy. This
- if we are in the "good" equilibrium - would translate into smaller government awareness
programs and higher equilibrium prevalence of the disease. This outcome would re‡ect the
preferences of the aware voters. Therefore, if expenditures on treatment were endogenous,
our model would exhibit a political substitutability between treatment and prevention.
13Proposition 4 An increase in the e¤ectiveness of private prevention (i.e. the fall in the
transmission rate 1￿￿) reduces the equilibrium awareness. If the economy is in the "good"
equilibrium, it might increase or decrease equilibrium prevalence.
Better private prevention (higher ￿) a¤ects both relations, (14) and (15). The "AIDS
epidemics" curve shifts downwards, because the disease spreads less, both inter- and intra-
generationally. The "Preferred policy" curve shifts leftwards, because better private preven-
tion means that the negative externality is weaker and thus the marginal bene…t of policy
is smaller, from the aware voters’ point of view. As a result, the equilibrium awareness (if
we are in the "good" equilibrium) unambiguously declines. The e¤ect on the prevalence is
unclear, because the two e¤ects - weaker epidemics and smaller policy - go in the opposite
direction. The overall impact on the prevalence depends on the relative strengths of these
two opposed forces.
Proposition 5 If the awarenes in the "good" equilibrium is su¢ciently close to the majority-
rule awareness threshold, a decrease in the intergenerational transmission of the disease
or awareness (lower ￿ or ￿), higher share of conservative agents (lower ￿), better private
prevention (higher ￿), higher unit price of policy (higher p), or a lower utility premium on
health (lower ￿) cause the "good" equilibrium to disappear.
The changes described in the proposition correspond to either the rightward shift in
"Majority support" line (lower ￿ or ￿), the leftward shift in the "Preferred policy" curve
(higher p, lower ￿, or higher ￿), or the downward shift in the "AIDS epidemics" curve (lower
￿ or higher ￿). If the level of awareness at the "good" equilibrium is su¢ciently close to the
majority-rule threshold, any of these shifts make the new "good" equilibrium fall to the left
of the "Majority support" line, thus making the "good" equilibrium to disappear.
The economic intuition for this comparative statics is as follows. Let’s start with changes
in the transmission of awareness and in the share of conservative agents. Lower transmission
of awareness across generations or a higher share of coservatives implies that the number of
past-generation aware voters should be higher, in order to generate enough new aware voters
(i.e. to couterweigh the reduction in transmission). In the steady-state, this means that the
number of aware citizens should be higher. If the economy is in the "good" equilibrium but
the existing number of aware voters is su¢ciently close to the threshold, these changes imply
14that existing number of aware voters becomes insu¢cient to create the majority at the vote.
Thus, the "good" equilibrium disappears.
Higher unit price of the policy, lower utility di¤erential between the healthy and the sick,
or a better private prevention, all reduce the marginal bene…t of the policy for aware voters,
and thus their preferred policy becomes smaller (for any level of prevalence). However, if
the number of aware voters is su¢ciently close to the threshold, this reduction in the policy
size implies that in the next period, there won’t be enough aware voters to constitute the
majority, which means that the "good" equilibrium vanishes.
Similarly, a lower inter-generational transmission of the disease or a better private pre-
vention reduce the spread of the disease for any level of awareness. This reduction in the
negative externality implies lower perferred policy of the aware voters. If the number of
aware voters is su¢ciently close to the threshold, these changes lead to the same e¤ect as
described just above.
2.4 Short-run dynamics
We can now turn to the short-run dynamics of the economy. Figure 6 describes graphically
the short-run behavior of the system.
[Figure 6 about here]
The following key results emerge from the analysis of Figure 6.
Proposition 6 The "good" equilibrium is fragile, i.e. a su¢ciently large drop in the disease
prevalence implies that the economy does not return to the "good" equilibrium, but instead
drifts away towards the "bad" equilibrium
Suppose that the economy is initially in the "good" steady-state equilibrium. Now let
the disease prevalence drop for some exogenous reason (for example, a fraction of sick get
isolated). Suppose also that this drop in prevalence is su¢ciently big (so as to fall below the
dashed line). Then, the preferred policy of the aware (that so far consitute the majority)
will be much smaller, which would imply that in the next period the fraction of aware voters
is too low to constitute the political majority. Then, the economy drifts towards the "bad"
steady- state equilibrium.
Note also that the fragility of the "good" equilibrium increases (in the sense that the drop
in prevalence su¢cient to make the economy drift away to the "bad" equilibrium), when the
15awareness in the "good" equilibrium is closer to the majority-rule threshold. This essentially
means that if the conditions of the Proposition 5 are satis…ed, the "good" equilibrium be-
comes very fragile. In other words, in this case the reversal of the economy to low-awareness
high-prevalence equilibrum becomes more likely.
Proposition 6 can help to understand the second puzzle - in the case of Uganda - that
we have discussed in the Introduction, i.e. why prevalence of the disease can raise after a
substantial decrease even in the countries that have adopted early agressive anti-HIV/AIDS
policies. Oster (2008) show that a substatial portion of the decline in HIV prevalence in
Uganda was driven by the exogenous factor - reduction in the mobility of truck drivers
caused by the fall in co¤ee prices. Our model predicts that if such drop in prevalence is
su¢ciently high, the next-period awareness campaigns will be so small as to undermine the
majority needed to keep the economy in the "good" equilibrium.
In fact, the subsequent rise in HIV prevalence in Uganda can be explained by this re-
duction in political support for awareness campaigns. Mutabaazi (2006) argues that the
reason why the prevalence is picking up again is the current reduction in the emphasis on
condom use in the ABC campaign, in favor of the …rst two components. Moreover, the au-
thor cites the Uganda AIDS commission report that notes the increasing complacency in the
population towards AIDS epidemic. Cohen et al. (2005) and Cohen and Tate (2006) argue
that this policy shift towards "abstinence-only" comes from the pressure of religious leaders
against condom use. Thus, the complacency in the general population caused by the early
sharp reduction in the disease prevalence because of the exogenous factors (drop in truck
driver mobility) has left the space to ABC policy opponents to obtain de facto majority and
to scrap a key component of the policy, which is now driving the increase in prevalence.
Therefore, unless NGOs and foreign donors put additional pressure to re-balance the ABC
campaign, Uganda is likely to ’crawl up’ to the "bad" equilibrium.
Proposition 7 If the economy is in the "bad" equilibrium, the awareness activities by NGOs
should be su¢ciently large, in order to have a permanent positive e¤ect.
Suppose that the economy is initially in the "bad" steady-state equilibrium. Now let
NGOs launch one-o¤ information campaigns, which implies that the awareness increases
exogenously (and the prevalence falls). If this increase in awareness is not su¢ciently big,
i.e. it does not create enough aware voters to constitute the majority, the next-period
government policy will remain zero. This means that the awareness over time will fall and
16the prevalence increase, making the economy crawl up along the "AIDS epidemics" line all
the way back to the "bad" equilibrium.
Contrarily, let the NGOs’ one-o¤ campaign be su¢ciently big to create enough aware
voters to make the majority. Then, as in the next period the prevalence remains relatively
high, aware voters vote for the maximum policy. This implies massive goverment information
campaigns and the subsequent decrease in the prevalence. As prevalence starts to decline,
aware voters vote for slightly smaller policy, and this process continues until the economy
reaches the "good" steady-state equilibrium.
This proposition shows that erratic awareness campaigns by NGOs or foreign donors may
temporarily lead the economy to the situation with high awareness and low prevalence, but
once these campaigns are cut, the situation unravels and the economy moves back to the
"bad" equilibrium. This calls for more stable outside interventions, to create the long-run
sustainability of low prevalence.
3 Conclusion
Understanding the determinants of government policies against HIV/AIDS epidemics in
developing countries, and, in particular, the gaping failure of some governments to respond
to the massive disease spread, is a major challenge in development economics. This paper
argues that this issue can be understood if the existence of a two-way relationship - from
policy to awareness and from awareness to policy - is taken into account. Two stable long-
run equilibria emerge, one with high prevalence and low awareness and the other with low
prevalence and high awareness. Moreover, this latter "good" equilibrium is fragile, i.e. a large
enough drop in prevalence erodes policy support to such extent that the economy drifts away
towards the former "bad" equilibrium. We also characterize the proper policy for NGOs and
foreign donors and stress the potential negative e¤ect of discontinuous awareness campaigns
by these entities.
Our model is built on several basic premises. First, the inter-generational transmission
of the disease is via sexual contact between the old and the unaware young. The alternative
assumption is that there exists the mother-to-child transmission (MTCT), which is zero if the
mother is aware. The timing of event then needs to be changed slightly, but the qualitative
results of the model are not altered. The reason why we have opted for our speci…cation
is that the relative importance of the MTCT as compared to the inter-generational sexual
17contacts is limited. For instance, Beyrer, Gauri, and Vaillancourt (2005) report the evolution
of new HIV/AIDS cases by mode of transmission: the weight of MTCT is negligible as
compared to other modes, the most important being heterosexual contact (see also Barrett
and Whiteside 2006: 354-355, for a discussion of current national and international actions
taken to reduce the MTCT). Second, the role of conservative citizens is limited to voting.
More realistically, they could dilute the e¤ectiveness of government policies if campaign
targeting is imperfect (as some of the campaign messages would be ’wasted’ on conservatives)
or they could play the role contrary to NGOs by, for instance, organizing campaigns against
the use of condoms (see Kwena 2004 for the discussion of the case of Kenya). Both of
these alternative assumptions would raise the majority-rule threshold, but the qualititative
properties of our model would not change. Third, old citizens do not play any active role
in the model. If no form of altruism is assumed, the old would always vote for zero policy
(as they do not receive any bene…t from positive policy), which would simply add an extra
conservative weight. If we assume …lial altruism (highly plausible in the societies with the
so-called limited morality, see Ban…eld 1958 and Platteau 2000), the issue of strategic inter-
period voting would arise. This additional complication would make the results of the model
less clear cut, and we leave this issue for future research.
We do not treat two further important issues. One is the choice of the number of partners.
Oster (2005) shows that although the di¤erences between the U.S. and sub-Saharan Africa
in the HIV prevalence are mainly explain by the di¤erence in transmission rates, the di¤er-
ences in the number of partners coupled with risky sex practices is the key determinant of
di¤erences in the spread of HIV/AIDS within Sub-Saharan Africa. Our model assumes only
one partner within the young generation. Introducing multiple partners and endogenizing
the number of partners is the natural next step in understanding the political-economic dy-
namics of the epidemics. The other issue is the multidimensional policies. Most government
policies combine prevention and treatment. The relative weight of these two large policy
segments certainly vary across time and countries, and understanding the sources of this
variation constitutes another key challenge in this research agenda.
As a …nal note, we would like to stress the applicability of our theoretical framework to
more general problems of political economy of public health. Unfortunately, HIV/AIDS is
only one of the many malaises that a-ict most developing countries and government policies
directed to combating these diseases are still studied very little from the political-economic
18perspective. The basic building blocks of our model - disease and awareness transmission
channels and political mechanisms that map con‡icting preferences into equilibrium public
health policies - would need to be adapted to the speci…c characteristics of a particular
disease under scrutiny.
References
[1] Ban…eld, E. (1958). The Moral Basis of a Backward Society, New York: Free Press.
[2] Barnett, T., and Whiteside, A. (2006). AIDS in the Twenty-First Century: Disease and
Globalization, 2nd ed. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
[3] Beyrer, C., Gauri, V., and Vaillancourt, D. (2005). "Evaluation of the World Bank’s
Assistance in Responding to the AIDS Epidemic: Brazil Case Study," OED Working
Paper, Washington, DC: World Bank
[4] Bor, J. (2007). "The Political Economy of AIDS Leadership in Developing Countries:
An Exploratory Analysis," Social Science and Medicine 64: 1585-1599.
[5] Cohen J., Schleifer, R., and Tate, T. (2005). "AIDS in Uganda: the Human-Rights
Dimension," Lancet 365: 2075-2076.
[6] Cohen J., and Tate, T. (2006). "The Less They Know, the Better: Abstinence-Only
HIV/AIDS Programs in Uganda," Reproductive Public Health 14: 174-178.
[7] Kwena, Z. (2004). "Politics, Etiquette, and the Fight Against HIV/AIDS in Kenya:
Negotiating for a Common Front," Africa Development 29: 113-131.
[8] Mutabaazi, E. (2006). "Rise in HIV/AIDS Slaps Uganda in the Face," UGPulse.com,
June 1.
[9] Oster, E. (2005). "Sexually Transmitted Infections, Sexual Behavior, and the HIV/AIDS
Epidemic," Quarterly Journal of Economics 120: 467-515.
[10] Oster, E. (2008). "Routes of Infection: Exports and HIV Incidence in Sub-Saharan
Africa," University of Chicago, mimeo.
[11] Platteau, J.-Ph. (2000). Institutions, Social Norms, and Economic Development, Har-
wood Academic Publishers.
19[12] USAID, UNAIDS, WHO, and the POLICY Project (2003). "The Level of E¤ort in the
National Response to HIV/AIDS: The AIDS Program E¤ort Index (API) 2003 Round,"
Research report, Washington, DC: USAID.
[13] Van de Walle, N. African Economies and the Politics of Permanent Crisis, 1979-1999.
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
[14] Whiteside, A., Mattes, R., Willan, S., and Manning, R. (2004). "What People Really
Believe About HIV/AIDS in Southern Africa," in Poku, N., and A. Whiteside (eds.),
The Political Economy of AIDS in Africa, London: Ashgate.
20H
I
V
 
P
r
e
v
a
l
e
n
c
e
 
a
n
d
 
P
o
l
i
c
y
 
E
f
f
o
r
t
y
 
=
 
0
,
0
7
9
2
x
 
+
 
7
1
,
0
4
6
R
2
 
=
 
0
,
0
0
3
2
0
2
0
4
0
6
0
8
0
1
0
0
1
2
0
0
5
1
0
1
5
2
0
2
5
3
0
3
5
4
0
4
5
H
I
V
 
P
r
e
v
a
l
e
n
c
e
,
 
%
 
o
f
 
a
d
u
l
t
s
 
1
5
-
4
9
 
y
r
s
 
o
l
d
A
v
e
r
a
g
e
 
A
P
I
 
s
c
o
r
e
,
 
2
0
0
1
-
2
0
0
3E
x
p
o
s
u
r
e
 
t
o
 
A
I
D
S
 
d
e
a
t
h
s
 
a
n
d
 
c
i
t
i
n
g
 
h
e
a
l
t
h
 
a
n
d
 
H
I
V
/
A
I
D
S
 
a
s
 
p
r
i
o
r
i
t
y
0
5
1
0
1
5
2
0
2
5
3
0
3
5
4
0
4
5
0
1
0
2
0
3
0
4
0
5
0
6
0
7
0
8
0
%
 
k
n
o
w
 
s
o
m
e
o
n
e
 
w
h
o
 
d
i
e
d
 
o
f
 
A
I
D
S
%
 
w
h
o
 
c
i
t
e
 
h
e
a
l
t
h
 
a
s
 
a
 
m
o
s
t
i
m
p
o
r
t
a
n
t
 
p
r
o
b
l
e
m
%
 
w
h
o
 
c
i
t
e
 
H
I
V
/
A
I
D
S
 
a
s
 
a
 
m
o
s
t
i
m
p
o
r
t
a
n
t
 
p
r
o
b
l
e
m